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1. INTRODUCTION
Quickly spreading from the United States in the global economy, the global finan-
cial crisis (GFC) has stood as further evidence for a highly globalised world. Par-
ticularly, the securitisation of the US sub-prime mortgages had a contagious effect 
on EU-28 credit markets. For the first time, EU-28 economic growth had a nega-
tive sign in 2009, affecting investments and business expectations in all Member 
States. Millions of employees have lost their jobs or experienced cuts in wages 
and other benefits. According to the International Labour Organization (ILO), glo-
bal unemployment increased by 5 million in 2013, to a total of almost 202 million 
people. At the same time, the EU-28 unemployment rate rose in 5 years from 7.1% 
in 2008 to 10.9% in 2013 according to EUROSTAT (2014). Bakker – Zeng (2013) 
noted of that such high rates are paralleled with great differences among EU coun-
tries in post-crisis employment performance and argue that real economic growth, 
market duality, and corporate balance sheets have caused the divergence among 
the mentioned economies. 
Androniceanu – Georgescu (2013) studied the insolvency problems that re-
sulted from the GFC, particularly in Greece, Portugal, and Ireland. Lane – Milesi-
Ferretti (2011) explained insolvency problems conditioning with large deficits in 
the pre-crisis period. Both the governments’ and the private sectors’ optimistic 
expectations in these countries were circumstanced by an economic activity boom 
in the pre-crisis period, which led them to enhance their spending. Meanwhile, 
facing an abrupt shrinkage of investments and rising unemployment, they were 
unable to withstand the damaging impact of the recent crisis alone, and turned to 
the IMF for financial assistance. 
Despite the IMF’s ongoing critiques, it has become a major player in crisis 
management. In order to ensure that it gets its money back and to reduce moral 
hazard, the Fund tied conditions to its programmes (Dreher 2009), which often 
entailed reduction in budget deficits, curbing of inflation, good track on debt 
service, and currency devaluation. Although the IMF Board of Governors consid-
ered achievement of a high level of employment and real income the overarching 
goal of the IMF already in 1946, IMF-style programmes were often coupled with 
notable social costs such as high unemployment, caps on wages, etc. (Vreeland 
2002; Nooruddin – Vreeland 2010). 
Most recently, the IMF (2013) has proclaimed job creation and inclusive 
growth as an imperative, and will provide policy advice and analyses to help 
Member States achieve the mentioned goals. We believe that recent changes in 
IMF policy and almost doubling of its budget could improve the effects on the 
economic situations of certain countries. Yet, Heise – Lierse (2011) note that 
public expenditure reduction is often driven by cutting welfare-state spending 
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and by ubiquitous public layoffs. Notably, the authors underline that Romania cut 
social benefits by 15%, while Greece reduced unemployment benefits by 22%. 
In addition, Portugal, the UK, Hungary, and Latvia were not exempt from poli-
cies that curtailed social benefits. In the case of Romania, Androniceanu (2012) 
highlights that such a brusque shrinkage of social benefits may be caused by the 
lack of managerial capacity in the central government. 
On the other hand, Caraway et al. (2012) found that IMF labour-related con-
ditionality could be negotiated and minimised by national governments and that 
this is more likely to happen in democratic countries with strong labour institu-
tions. Although few studies have addressed this issue, there is some empirical 
evidence for the adverse effects of IMF programmes on employment (Vreeland 
2002; Nooruddin – Vreeland 2010). The dearth of sufficient evidence has been 
caused by the following four issues: the lack of data, selection bias, endogene-
ity, and adverse selection (Heckman 1979; Dreher 2006; Bas – Stone 2014). The 
first issue is solved by the IMF becoming more transparent and making all ar-
rangements public. Still, the remaining three are still consistent and should be 
addressed when assessing IMF programmes. 
Given that the IMF clients before the GFC were mostly developing countries 
with weak institutional fundamentals, it is of utmost interest to estimate the ef-
fects of IMF programmes on employment within the EU. Therefore, we put the 
following research question: Do IMF programmes lower employment once a 
country is under a programme, and if so, to what extent? Therefore, our study 
applies a with-and-without approach by creating counterfactuals by employing 
propensity score matching (PSM), which significantly reduces selection bias by 
controlling on observable variables. The remainder of the article is as follows: the 
theoretical and empirical evidence is presented in Section 2, Section 3 discusses 
the data and framework of estimation, while the results and discussions are pro-
vided in Section 4. Section 5 concludes.
2. IMF PROGRAMMES AND EMPLOYMENT
2.1. Conditionality of loans
One can distinguish between two types of loans: concessional and non-conces-
sional. Concessional loans are provided to low-income countries only, and assume 
zero interest payments. In our research, we are interested in non-concessional 
loans, as between 1993 and 2013, no EU Member State benefited from conces-
sional loans. Hence, the main lending toolkits for chosen countries are Stand-
By Arrangements (SBA) and Extended Fund Facility (EFF). The most common 
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programme, as stated by Oberdabernig (2013), is a SBA that provides short-term 
assistance, usually for one to two years, and with higher conditionality compared 
to other types of IMF lending. The EFF, which lasts three years, is designed to 
tackle mid-term problems of balance of payments. 
While the establishment of pre-conditionality was discussed by the Meltzer 
Commission (2004), the really important step was made in 2009 by creating two 
novel facilities based on ex-ante conditionality. The Flexible Credit Line (FCL) 
has lighter conditionality, but rigorous pre-selection. The Precautionary and Li-
quidity Line (PLL) is a mix of ex-ante and ex-post conditionality designed to 
meet urgent balance of payments needs. During the observation period among 
our countries, only Poland obtained a FCL in 2009. With such facilities, the IMF 
tries to reduce conditionality for developed countries, which over the years has 
been affecting governments’ decisions to resort to the IMF. 
Yet what exactly does conditionality mean and entail? Participation in an IMF 
programme is a joint decision of two negotiating sides: the IMF board and the 
government of the potential participant country. In general terms, conditionality 
is a set of requirements that the Fund attaches to the loan to assure stable econom-
ic growth and to guarantee the return of its money. Conway (2003) defines con-
ditionality as the endogenous outcome of a bargaining process. Until the 1980s, 
conditionality was focused on macroeconomic policies, while by gradually in-
creasing the programme-participation of low-income countries, it involved mi-
croeconomic indicators as well. However, there is a great difference of opinion in 
the literature about the effectiveness of conditionality due to the low compliance 
of governments. Lamdany (2009) concluded that the compliance rate was 60%, 
which was comparatively higher in the core area of IMF competency. Brown’s 
(2009) study of Latin America’s conditional lending show that unemployment 
rates were higher in countries that turned to the Fund for assistance. Further-
more, Lane (2012) criticised the IMF for copying its standard practices for the 
EU Member States (Greece, Portugal, Ireland) without considering the domestic 
specifics. 
2.2.  Theoretical effects of IMF conditionality on employment
A common feature of IMF conditionality is a reduction of budget deficit. This 
can be achieved either by increasing budget revenue, or by cutting spending. 
Both methods are believed to have a negative impact on employment. Increasing 
budget incomes can be done through taxes and the privatisation of state-owned 
enterprises (SOE). Oberdabernig (2013) noted that because of uncertainty among 
business and the hampering effects on investments caused by taxation changes, 
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governments often avoid such modifications. Instead, they are advised by IMF 
officials to cut the losses of SOEs, which often entails the privatisation of these 
enterprises coupled with public lay-offs. At the same time, reduction in public ex-
penditures is less problematic. According to the IMF MONA database, of the 142 
current IMF programmes, 120 have public expenditure reduction requirements. 
As Vreeland (2002) noted, cuts in public expenditures are often driven by new 
hiring in the public sector. Thus, it often leads to cuts and freezes in public wages, 
decrease in public employment, and curtailing social spending. 
The influence of trade liberalisation on employment has an ambiguous effect. 
It could affect employment by lowering wages in state-protected sectors. At the 
same time, Handa – King (1997) claim that trade liberalisation contributes to 
labour-intensive sectors by increasing demand and wages. The other requirement 
that can influence employment is curbing inflation. The typical way to curb infla-
tion is to increase interest rates, which has a hampering effect both on consumer 
and business demands. The former takes place due to costly credits and producers 
losing some of the benefits, while the latter has a negative impact on investments 
by making them expensive, which may cause a decrease in employment.
A recent study by IMF officials regarding the effects of IMF programmes on 
the labour force concludes that the IMF has recommended protection of workers 
through greater flexibility in wage-setting and the expansion of unemployment 
insurances (Blanchard et al. 2014). Thus, they found that the IMF advice was in 
place and that further responsibility for implementation needed to be shouldered 
by national governments through compliance. Yet, according to earlier discus-
sions, the channels of the IMF influence on employment are indirect, rather than 
direct, through policy advice. Moreover, Dreher (2006) argues that the three com-
ponents of IMF programmes, namely conditionality, lending, and policy advice, 
could have quite different impacts on the economy. Policy advice does not always 
entail that IMF programmes will have positive effects on employment, while fur-
ther problems are due to either government incapacity to implement the recom-
mendations or an unwillingness to follow them.  
2.3. Empirical evidence of IMF conditionality’s impact on employment
There are many studies that seek to study IMF programmes on incomes, which is 
necessarily related to employment to a certain extent; however, to the best of our 
knowledge, there is a lack of evidence regarding IMF programmes’ direct effects 
on employment. 
The first cross-country study of the IMF’s impact on income distribution was 
conducted by Pastor (1987), in which he employed a “before-after” approach to 
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compare the dependent variable before and after the implementation of an IMF 
programme, using non-programme countries as a control variable. Taking the 
evidence from 18 Latin American countries over a period from 1965 to 1981, 
the author found that IMF programmes contributed to the distribution of income 
away from workers. Garuda (2000) assessed the distributional effects of IMF pro-
grammes by employing a then new technique for controlling differences of initial 
economic circumstances of different countries based on Conway’s (1994). He 
constructed propensity scores to tackle the problem of selection bias on observed 
variables. The findings claimed significant deterioration of income distribution 
in under-program countries when pre-program external imbalance was severe. 
However, Garuda’s method did not cover the political variables that may influ-
ence a government’s decision to resort to the IMF and further reduce the bias of 
omitted variable. Hence, our study attempts to fill this gap by introducing politi-
cal factors such as availability of veto power, election year, etc. into the model. 
The first study using parametric methods for controlling non-random selection 
was conducted by Vreeland (2002), in which the author used the dynamic version 
of Heckman’s (1979) selection model to describe labour share in the income vari-
able with 2095 observations over a period from 1961 to 1993. He argues that the 
IMF participation contributes to raising inequality by lowering the labour share 
of income in the manufacturing sector. Moreover, labour is best off in countries 
never participating and worst off in countries currently participating in an IMF 
programme. Recently, Nooruddin – Vreeland (2010) too found adverse effects of 
IMF programmes on under-programme countries. In particular, countries under 
an IMF-supported programme were more likely to cut public wages and elimi-
nate public jobs.
3. METHODOLOGY AND DATA
3.1. Methodology
In our case, we faced data limitations, as many new EU-member states were 
not independent economies prior to the regime change, and therefore the earliest 
available data are from 1993 only. 
Faced with such limitations and motivated by Garuda (2000) and Hutchison’s 
(2004) methodology, we have chosen to predict propensity scores and by match-
ing them to measure average treatment effects on the treated (ATT). This is a 
very useful method in biostatistics, as it allows researchers to reveal the effects 
of medicine on a treatment group by comparing them with a control group (same 
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health conditions without treatment). The same logic applies here, where IMF 
programmes assume the role of prescribed medicine for recipient countries. There 
are various methods of the evaluation of IMF programmes’ effects dealing with 
selection problems, among them
• Heckman selection model (Heckit), 
• Propensity Score Matching (PSM), and 
• Instrumental - Variable (IV) approach. 
However, the afore-mentioned methods claim certain requirements. Already 
Vreeland noted that large number of observations were required for the Heckit 
model and that he resolved the issue by employing the labour share of income 
from manufacturing as the dependent variable, which ensured 2095 observations, 
the longest series of data at that time. Since the scope of the current research is 
to reveal the impact of IMF programmes on employment in the EU Member 
States, we faced data limitations, as the IMF MONA database provides data on 
IMF arrangements since 1993. Thus, the maximum available sample for current 
research comprised 588 country-year observations, taking into consideration the 
availability of 21 years and 28 EU member countries. 
The IV approach can be conducted with fewer observations, as by Barro – Lee 
(2005), who used 613 observations and proximity to the EU and US as an instru-
mental variable. The idea of IV is to find variables that influence governments’ 
decision to resort to the IMF, but without affecting the outcome variable. In our 
case, the political proximity to the EU and the US cannot be used as instrumental 
variables since the sample includes only EU states. As a kind of instrumental 
variable, Vreeland (2007) suggested the number of citizens that a certain country 
has at the IMF staff, as it may impact IMF participation, while it should not influ-
ence economic growth in that country. However, this information is not readily 
attainable, and thus we could not get access to this kind of data.
Although one major drawback of PSM is that it does not control for selection 
on unobservables, it does not require a large sample as soon as the propensity 
score is balanced within the treated and control groups. Moreover, Cepeda et al. 
(2003) used Monte Carlo simulations to compare logistic regression with pro-
pensity scores and concluded that the latter produced more accurate results given 
seven or less events per confounder. Hence, the most appropriate method in terms 
of data handiness and selection bias reduction is PSM combined with Difference-
in-Differences (DiD), where the latter completes PSM by combating the issue 
of unobservables. The choice of the ATT parameter is motivated by its ability to 
assess the success of IMF programmes by evaluating treated countries that the 
programmes had been initially designed for (Heinrich et al. 2010). Moreover in 
the case of ATT, the two following assumptions on unconfoundedness and com-
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mon support could be weakened by only satisfying the mean independence of the 
treatment and control groups. Having those assumptions, the general equation of 
PSM for ATT can be determined as:
  (1)
The equation could be interpreted as the mean difference between outcomes over 
the common support weighted by the propensity score distribution of participants. 
Caliendo – Kopeinig (2008) already highlighted that PSM is not a “magic bullet” 
to solve all problems related to the evaluation. Therefore, it should be employed 
whenever selection on observables or conditional dependence is best approached 
based on a thorough understanding of the issue and information richness of data. 
However, by conditioning observable covariates, equation (1) means that the 
outcome is not correlated (mean-independent) with IMF programme participa-
tion. In order to loosen this strong assumption, the current research employs DiD 
and regression-adjusted matching estimators. The DiD uses a semi-parametric 
technique to build differences by comparing the employment rate (outcome vari-
able) of the treated countries before and after participation with the employment 
rate of untreated countries (Heckman et al. 1998). Smith – Todd (2005) noted 
that the DiD estimator allows a non-linear relationship between the treatment and 
outcome variables by balancing the observations. Since our chosen parameter is 
ATT, the combination of PSM with the DiD approach can be described with the 
following equation:
  (2)
where t is the after- and t_1 is the prior-programme participation period. This 
too demands satisfaction of overlap assumption. Since the data employed in the 
research are panel data, they allow the estimation of PSM in both after- and prior-
participation periods and then measure the difference between them easily by 
distinguishing participants from non-participants. Moreover, according to Smith 
– Todd (2005), such a DiD estimator with panel data is less sensitive than match-
ing estimators based on cross-section data.
Furthermore, by consulting the literature on the appropriate model to calculate 
propensity scores, the preference was given to the probit model, which combats 
the drawback of linear probability models, i.e. it calculates highly-skewed vari-
ables and makes predictions out of a [0,1] interval of probabilities. 
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The calculation of propensity scores is followed by the employment of match-
ing methods to deal with sample selection bias. There are different algorithms 
designed to execute matching based on the ATT parameter, of which we have 
employed the following four: nearest neighbour (ATTN), radius (ATTR), strati-
fication (ATTS), and kernel (ATTK). Those four were included in the analyses, 
as there is no universally-recognised matching algorithm to treat all cases ap-
propriately. In addition, the estimation of these four matching methods enables 
checking for the robustness of the results. In addition, a regression-adjusted (RA) 
mаtching estimаtor was employed to correct biases from omitted variable by in-
corporating the above-mentioned algorithms with regression-adjusted covariates 
(Heckman et al. 1998). More precisely, the RA provides an opportunity to solve 
the drawback of Local Linear Matching estimators (e.g. ATTN, ATTR, ATTS, 
ATTK), which fail to address the linkage between treatment variable and the out-
come variable. Therefore, the regression-adjusted estimators utilised the existing 
difference of covariates to decrease the potential bias caused by the likelihood of 
not correct matching. 
It must be noted that all these methods have to be implemented only when the 
common support and the overlap assumption are satisfied. This can be checked 
either by the visual analysis of propensity score distribution in the control and 
treatment groups or by trimming the sample and with minima and maxima com-
parison. In the case of ATT, the sufficient requirement is to ensure that there are 
matches in the control group.
3.2. Data and choice of covariates
This study used cross-country data for 28 EU Member States over the period be-
tween 1993 and 2013. The sample included only concessionary loans, where the 
basic facilities were SBAs and FCLs with a two-year duration.1 The changes in 
employment and youth employment rates (EMPR and YEMPR) were chosen as 
our outcome variables, while changes in unemployment (UNEMPR) were used 
for sensitivity checks of matching methods. It was assumed that the ATT for out-
come variable EMPR and UNEMPR should be in different directions in order to 
show that the results are not driven by a particular specification.
Table 1 illustrates descriptive statistics of both outcome variables and covari-
ates sorted by their participation in an IMF programme, coded 0 and 1 for non-
1  Due to space limitation, information about countries and number of years spent under IMF 
programmes, figures and conducted test results are available only upon request from the 
authors .
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participation and participation, respectively. For avoiding the problem of endog-
eneity and simultaneity, Sturm et al. (2005) advise to employ IMF participation 
determinants with a one-year lag. Therefore, we first calculated propensity scores 
for the theoretical assumptions about the relationship between determinants and 
IMF participation, which is shown in the first column of Table 2. Then, propen-
sity scores were calculated based on one-year lagged covariates, which are pre-
sented in column 2 of Table 2.  
There are specific methods for identifying the worthiness of the inclusion of 
covariates: statistical significance, hit or miss, and leave-one-out cross-valida-
tion. Since our covariates are balanced and define IMF programme participation 
in the right direction, we left statistically non-significant variables in the probit 
model for the further reduction of bias related with omitted variables. In addition, 
Rubin – Thomas (1996) argue that covariates should be eliminated only if they 
are not proper or are not related to the outcome. 
Based on previous findings on the importance of political determinants in the 
choice to participate in an IMF programme, our study includes both economic 
and political variables in order to further reduce the bias of omitted variables. 
Particularly, Knight – Santaella (1997) found that participation in an IMF pro-
gramme was not random and demonstrated that low GDP per capita, weak eco-
nomic growth, and reduction in investments and international reserves were ma-
jor determinants of the governments’ decision. Additionally, the shrinkage of the 
current account balance (CAB) as a percentage of GDP has been shown to be 
an important determinant (Nooruddin – Woo 2015), and countries experiencing 
high inflation and carrying high government debt are likely to participate in IMF 
programmes (Moser – Sturm 2011).
Apart from economic covariates, there is a broad consensus that political fac-
tors could drive government’s decision to resort to the IMF. Vreeland (2004) 
found that the availability of veto players (CHECKS) could motivate govern-
ments to apply to the IMF, reducing the likelihood of veto. Thus, the logarithm of 
CHECKS was employed in our regression. Furthermore, Przeworski – Vreeland 
(2000) concluded that countries after elections were more likely to enter into an 
arrangement; hence, the lagged legislative elections (LEGELEC1) variable was 
incorporated into the model. Another important variable is government stabil-
ity, which is negatively correlated with IMF participation according to Sturm 
et al. (2005). In addition, Vreeland (2006) found that past participation in an 
IMF programme could positively impact the government’s decision. Therefore, 
cumulative years under IMF programme (SUMUN) and participation in the past 
(PASTAG) were used as covariates in the analysis. 
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Table 1 shows that IMF participation counted around 100 country-year obser-
vations, which is about 18% of the full sample. Furthermore, it can be noted that 
during the observed period, IMF participants were, on average, in worse condi-
tions than non-participants. The latter corroborates the assumption that countries 
participating in IMF programmes had serious economic problems and that the 
above-discussed determinants may influence a government’s decision to partici-
pate in IMF programmes. More precisely, it assumes that states with low GDP 
per capita, higher inflation, low investment rates, and lower economic growth are 
more likely to turn to the IMF for financial assistance. 
It must be noted that Moser – Sturm’s (2011) review of 17 studies on deter-
minants of IMF programme participation did not find labour market variables as 
determining factors for governments to turn to the IMF. This may further reduce 
probability of “Ashenfelter’s dip” in our study, i.e. a decrease in employment is 
less likely to affect governments’ decision to participate in IMF programmes. To 
test the availability of dip, we composed graphs with these two variables for the 
14 countries that have participated in an IMF programme and two not-participant 
countries (Spain and Slovenia) in the observed period. 
Table 1. Descriptive statistics 
 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1
Variable Obs Obs Mean Mean
Std. 
Dev.
Std. 
Dev. Min Min Max Max
yemprate 460 100 –.871 –3.29 6.25 6.69 –22.4 –26.14 43.98 13.47
emprate 482 90 .721 –1.15 2.30 3.16 –10.2 –14.3 10.95 4.41
inv1 454 92 22.64 21.60 4.27 6.02 11.4 .103 39.55 39.95
cab1 452 100 –2.18 –4.74 15.25 5.21 –154.1 –24.10 44.62 8.63
infl 456 100 7.99 27.04 72.43 112.04 –1.70 –1.57 1517 1061
growth 448 92 2.50 2.74 3.36 4.86 –14.84 –17.70 10.98 11.74
gdppc1 470 96 27,247 13,910 12,495 8,847 5462 5790 91,642 45,756
gdebt 438 98 54.96 45.31 28.25 38.00 –3.64 4.79 137.5 170.32
reserve 448 88 2.01 4.01 1.81 2.61 .010 0.66 7.95 8.90
pastag 482 106 .217 .258 .413 .412 0 0 1 1
sumun 482 106 1.37 5.67 3.18 3.74 0 1 14 15
logchecks 458 99 1.40 1.28 .307 .368 0 .693 2.30 2.08
stabs 457 98 .148 .162 .285 .293 0 0 1 1
legelec1 458 102 .268 .245 .443 .432 0 0 1 1
Source: Authors’ calculation.
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4. EFFECTS OF IMF PROGRAMMES ON EMPLOYMENT: 
EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE
4.1. Propensity score estimation and matching
Propensity scores were calculated employing probit regression using the “teffect-
psmatch” package in the Stata 13 software. First, we calculated the score based 
on the full sample with 477 observations. Then, the trimmed sample was em-
ployed, after eliminating countries that never participated in IMF programmes 
during the observed period. Table 2 shows the output of our regression, where 
pseudo R2 for regression comprised 0.51, 0.52, and 0.31 for Models 1, 2, and 3. 
The third model represents regression based on the trimmed sample. The models 
precisely predict 71%, 74%, and 75% of IMF participation, respectively, based 
on calculated propensity scores. We use blockid in the specification to split the 
sample into blocks based on scores, which are 6 and 5, respectively, for the full 
and the trimmed samples. The balancing property was automatically run and has 
been satisfied, which means that in each of these blocks, not only the propensity 
scores were similar, but also the covariates on which we match. 
Before discussing the correlation of the obtained coefficients with our treat-
ment variable, it must be noted that the common support option has been selected. 
The common support condition is valid, as countries with the same features can-
not be observed in both the treated and the control group. The regions of com-
mon support are (0.012, 0.976) and (0.025, 0.961) for the full and the trimmed 
samples, respectively. Thus, the requirement on common support has been en-
sured, which, according to Heckman et al. (1997), is a major source of biased 
propensity score assessment. In order to check the overlap assumption, the distri-
butions of propensity scores for full and trimmed samples have been plotted. It is 
revealed that there were no substantial differences between the distributions and 
that they were spread asymmetrically within the control and the treated groups. 
The slight inclination towards the rump in the trimmed sample illustrates that 
countries in the treatment group were more likely to resort to the IMF. To com-
plete the checks, the kernel density of propensity scores has been estimated based 
on the Epanechnikov function with 0.023 bandwidth, where the graph revealed 
that the measured propensities, namely that an under-programme country would 
be under-programme and a non-programme country would not participate in IMF 
programmes, were in the area of coincidence.
The correlation of covariates with the IMF participation dummy was consist-
ent with theoretical assumptions and previous empirical findings. It was esti-
mated that in the observed period, countries experiencing low contemporaneous 
economic growth and international reserves, decrease in investments and in cab, 
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higher inflation, and government debt were more likely to resort to the IMF. Yet, 
among those six covariates, cab1 was not statistically significant in Model 1, 
while it became significant at the 5% level in Model 2 employing its logarithm 
value.
Table 2. Propensity score calculation with a probit model
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Covariates Coefficient Covariates Coefficient Coefficient
gdppc1
–.001
loggdppc1
–.042 –.023
(.000***) (.018) *** (.007)***
growth
–.038
growth1
–.034 –.029
(.029**) (–.009) *** (.009)**
inv1
–.077
loginv1
–.036 –.045
(.030**) (.012) *** (.002)**
infl
.071
loginfl1
.052 .044
(.026**) (.037) *** (.040)
gdebt
.017
gdebt1
.008 .011
(.006***) (.001)** (.003)**
reserve
–.031
reserve1
–.021 –.027
(.013**) (.001) ** (.001)**
cab1
–.018
logcab1
–.016 –.008
(–.006) (.005) ** (.004)*
pastag
1.28
pastag
1.72
N/A
(.386***) (.089) ***
sumun
.174
sumun
.122 .132
(.040***) (.010) ** (.012)**
logchecks
.822
logchecks1
.631 .724
(.041*) (.398) * (.376)*
stabs
–.631
logstabs1
–.326 –.277
(–.495) (.129) ** (.142)**
legelec1
.145
legelec1
.007 .051
(–.321) (–.098) (.113)
intercept
–2.10
intercept
.932 .707
(–1.52***) (–.467)*** (.442)***
Observations 477 468 154
Chi squared 187.5 184.0 60.2
Pseudo R squared .513 .521 .312
Correct prediction .71 .74 .75
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. * Significant at the 10% level; ** significant at the 5% level; *** sig-
nificant at the 1% level ; N/A: pastag in the trimmed sample was dropped due to collinearity. 
Source: Authors’ calculation.
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As it has been supposed, countries with lower income resorted to the IMF 
more often, which was indicated by the first year lagged value of GDP per capita 
in the model. 
The estimated coefficients of political covariates underpin the theoretical con-
siderations. More precisely, there is evidence that past experience of collabora-
tion with the IMF makes it more probable for countries to become involved in 
IMF programmes. Furthermore, the availability of veto players (logchecks) or 
an increase in their number has been positively correlated, being significant at 
the 10% level. Another two political covariates, government stability (stabs) and 
prior legislative elections (legelec1), though non-significant statistically, prove 
that the theoretical assumptions have been correct, i.e. government instability and 
prior elections could lead to IMF participation. It should be noted that in the sec-
ond specification and with the trimmed sample, the covariate of government sta-
bility was introduced with a one-year lag and by its logarithmic value (logstabs1), 
which was statistically significant at the 5% level, preserving negative and even 
strengthened correlation with IMF participation. 
In the trimmed sample, the coefficients have been intensified by revealing a 
stronger correlation between the dependent and independent variables. Further-
more, we have estimated the probit model by introducing higher-order terms in 
the specification. Dehejia – Wahba (2002) found this method useful for obtaining 
a balancing property within each stratum. In our case, the balancing property has 
been satisfied by the initial specification. However, by employing the squared 
and logarithm values of covariates, some improvements were achieved, bringing 
evidence that the results are persistent and further average treatment effect could 
be measured.  
The optimal number of blocks for both full and trimmed samples, where the 
balance of propensity scores is obtained, has been chosen. This number of blocks 
ensures that the mean propensity score is not different for the treated and the 
controls in each block, and define the inferior bounds of blocks. Aakvik (2001) 
found it sufficient to justify the choice of the blocks via securing the balance of 
propensity scores within each block.
4.2. Matching results and effects of IMF programmes on employment
We evaluated the effects of IMF programmes in the programme initiation year, 
and two years after initiation, given the wide consensus in the literature regard-
ing the lagged effects of IMF programmes. In particular, of the three components 
of IMF programmes, only lending may have an immediate effect on economies, 
while policy advice and conditionality have a lagged impact due to the interval 
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between domestic policy design and implementation. Table 3 presents matching 
results based on regression-adjusted residuals (Rubin residuals), while Tables 4 
and 5 illustrate results obtained by matching on residuals of Model 2. Given the 
limited number of observations, the current research conducted matching involv-
ing Rubin residuals since it incorporates the full sample, while Heckman residu-
als are measured based on the non-participation sample. In order to carry out the 
Rubin regression-adjusted matching estimator, we first measured a specification 
that controls for the fаctors different from IMF participation, which still may 
impact the assessment of employment rate. Then, the residuals, i.e. unexplained 
employment growth, are compared for recipient and non-recipient observations 
employing the four afore-mentioned matching algorithms (Table 3). 
To reduce the variance, all matching methods include errors bootstrapping, 
which was ordered to implement 150 iterations per method. The scope of these 
iterations is to approximate the sample distribution to its mean. Furthermore, 
by consulting the literature, it has identified a 0.05 interval as being appropriate 
for defining the maximum distance of propensity scores in the radius algorithm 
(Hutchison 2004; Heinrich et al. 2010; Roman – Popescu 2014). Furthermore, 
we have implemented matching on the full and the trimmed samples to check the 
robustness. In both cases, no major violations of the assumption we observed, 
which allowed drawing important conclusions.
All four algorithms revealed the IMF programmes’ negative impact on em-
ployment (–0.6, –1%), where t-statistics show that all coefficients are signifi-
Table 3. IMF programmes effects by Rubin regression-adjusted residuals matching 
with DiD estimator
ATTN ATTR (0.05) ATTK ATTS
Contemporaneous effects on employment rate (Model 6)
Estimated IMF impact –.642 –.715 –.428 –.606
T-stat 3.224 2.125 2.837 2.328
Number of observations 91 279 286 286
Employment rate DiD (Model 6)
Estimated IMF impact –.507 –.641 –.397 –.579
T-stat 3.276 2.745 2.214 3.083
Number of observations 89 276 282 282
Two-year effects on employment rate (Model 6)
Estimated IMF impact –.128 –.342 .157 –0.089
T-stat 2.151 2.462 1.559 2.083
Number of observations 89 277 284 284
Abbreviations: Nearest neighbour (ATTN), radius (ATTR), kernel (ATTK), stratification (ATTS) effects. 
Source: Author’s calculation.
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cant on conventional levels, except the kernel method that fell between –2, 2. 
These adverse effects palpably decreased over the period, but still remained nega-
tive (–0.64%, –0.36%) after two years of programme initiation, where kernel 
matching found positive, but non-significant effects on employment. Moreover, 
evidence from the trimmed sample suggests that employment declined more in 
under-programme countries than in non-participants, attributing negative impacts 
to the IMF programmes both in the programme year and after two years. 
Except for ATTN, the remaining three methods found that IMF affects youth 
employment in the programme initiation year (–0.24%, –1.5%), where ATTR and 
ATTS coefficients were significant. In contrast, ATTN, although insignificant, 
showed that there might be a positive (0.91%) influence. Implementation of the 
same operations with the trimmed sample reduced the negative impact by up to 
(–0.09%, –0.34%), with significant coefficients from radius and kernel match-
ing. At the same time, the ATTN coefficient became significant, while virtually 
identical to those with negative findings. The situation notably improves with 
the two-year impact of IMF programmes on youth employment. The ATTN and 
Table 4. Average treatment effect in program year
 ATTN ATTR (0.05) ATTK ATTS
Employment (full sample)
Estimated IMF impact –1.092 –.989 –.603 –.799
T-stat –2.028 –2.296 –1.987 –2.182
Employment (trimmed sample)
Estimated IMF impact –.285 –.293 –.584 –.346
T-stat –3.040 –1.129 –.806 –2.522
Youth employment (full sample)
Estimated IMF impact .919 –1.530 –.240 –1.014
T-stat .265 –1.326 –2.261 –2.006
Youth employment (trimmed sample)
Estimated IMF impact .041 –.337 –.178 –.099
T-stat 2.223 –2.897 –2.038 –.510
Unemployment (full sample)
Estimated IMF impact .976 .412 –.771 .274
T-stat 1.702 2.168 –1.081 1.338
Unemployment (trimmed sample)
Estimated IMF impact .752 .737 –.096 .157
T-stat 4.537 3.424 –.154 3.111
Full observations 93 284 291 291
Trimmed observations 83 123 138 138
Abbreviations: See Table 3.
Source: Authors’ calculation.
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ATTK found that after participation in IMF programmes, youth employment in-
creased (0.04%, 1.2%) in countries initiating IMF participation. However, ATTR 
and ATTS still revealed a negative impact on youth employment in the states with 
IMF programmes. The differences in the latest two are significant at conventional 
levels, while a positive impact is consistent with ATTN in the trimmed sample. 
Furthermore, in order to test the sensitivity of obtained results, the average 
treatment effects of IMF participation have been measured using unemployment 
as the outcome variable. This test may confirm that the results are persistent, 
since they were identical to those with employment. Although statistically non-
significant at conventional levels in some cases, it is interesting that most of the 
results show palpable negative effects due to IMF programme participation, with 
the largest negative contemporaneous effects being a decrease of –1.01% and 
–0.28%, respectively, after two years of initiation. 
The matching based on Rubin regression-adjusted residuals reveals that IMF 
programme participation has a negative impact on employment both in the pro-
gramme year and after two years of programme initiation, corroborating the re-
sults presented in Tables 4 and 5. Particularly, statistically significant negative 
Table 5. Average treatment effect after 2 years of program initiation 
 ATTN ATTR (0.05)  ATTK ATTS
Employment (full sample)
Estimated IMF impact –.133 –.642 .164 –.097
T-stat –2.326 –1.298 1.115 –2.855
Employment (trimmed sample)
Estimated IMF impact –.278 –.093 –.413 –.108
T-stat –4.354 –1.783 1.567 3.222
Youth employment (full sample) 
Estimated IMF impact 1.219 –.879 .256 –.688
T-stat 1.578 –2.319 .404 –1.077
Youth employment (trimmed sample) 
Estimated IMF impact .745 –.907 .046 –.573
T-stat –3.001 1.989 .007 –1.374
Unemployment (full sample)
Estimated IMF impact .563 .357 –.551 .226
T-stat 2.224 2.887 –.654 2.741
Unemployment (trimmed sample) 
Estimated IMF impact .896 –.471 –.143 .186
T-stat 3.635 –1.338 –.154 4.252
Full observations 91 238 258 258
Trimmed observations 79 117 129 129
Source: Author’s calculation.
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coefficients have been gauged by four matching algorithms in average reducing 
employment by –0.59% in the programme initiation year. Although the negative 
effects of IMF programme participation were notably reduced after two years 
of programme participation, they still remained, resulting a –0.1% reduction in 
employment rate (Table 3).   
The estimation of employment rate differences between programme and non-
programme observations too indicated the negative contemporaneous effects of 
programme participation on employment. Thus, controlling for unobservable 
variables by the DiD estimator in average IMF programme participation reduced 
the employment rate by –0.53% during the 1993–2013 period. In sum, the results 
demonstrate that employment rate is notably affected by IMF programmes, which 
are supported statistically significant coefficients once one controls for selection 
both on the observable and unobservable variables.
5. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUDING REMARKS
Our study sought to reveal IMF programme effects on employment within the 
EU. Of the 28 EU Member States, only 14 have participated in an IMF pro-
gramme between 1993 and 2013. Moreover, of those participating countries, 10 
are former socialist countries and of this group, only Slovenia has not turned to 
the IMF for assistance in the observed period. In the euro zone, Greece, Ireland, 
Portugal, and Cyprus have accepted IMF conditions, which were conditioned by 
the recent financial crisis that led to insolvency problems. This was the first time 
since the 1980s that the IMF gave loans to developed countries. Thus, one may 
consider that it is a step forward towards its roots as a global institution, which 
was created to solve problems of balance of payment and to ensure long-term 
growth not only for its low-income members.
The few studies devoted to evaluating the effects of IMF participation on em-
ployment have found adverse effects on employment. Particularly, Pastor (1987) 
and Vreeland (2002) examined the income distribution effects under IMF pro-
grammes and concluded that by further deteriorating income distribution, labour 
was worse off in recipient countries in terms of income. However, the first study 
did not reckon with the problem of non-random selection, while the dependent 
variable in the second one was the labour share of income from manufacturing, 
which was the biggest available data on that moment, even though the assump-
tion that manufacturing is the main sector in the economy of under-programme 
countries was a serious abstraction. Later, Nooruddin – Vreeland (2010) found 
that countries participating in IMF programmes tended to lower public salaries 
and wages, while the temporary members of the United Nations Security Council 
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were in favourable conditions and even increased wages and salaries. More over, 
the assessment of the employment rate of EU members participating in the IMF 
programmes offered another opportunity to reveal whether the ability of demo-
cratic countries to negotiate labour conditionality (Caraway et al. 2012) mitigates 
the adverse effects of IMF programmes on employment. Our study confirms pre-
vious empirical findings by demonstrating the negative impact of IMF participa-
tion on employment in the short-term, having controlled for selection on observa-
bles using the propensity score matching method. In particular, we found that 
IMF participation lowered total employment by –0.87% in the programme year 
and by –0.11% after two years of programme initiation. These averages are cal-
culated based on statistically-significant coefficients. However, based on Rubin 
regression-adjusted residuals, the average negative impact decreased by –0.59% 
for contemporaneous effects and by –0.1% for the two-year effect, but the robust-
ness of the coefficients were significantly improved. The results remain persist-
ent once we control for selection on unobservables employing the DiD estimator, 
where the IMF programmes decrease employment by –0.53% on average, with 
all coefficients statistically significant at conventional levels. Even though the 
IMF advises governments to protect employment, its conditionality requires con-
tractionary policies such as curbing inflation and budget deficit reduction, which 
is often achieved by wage freezes in the public sector, caps on salaries, and even 
the elimination of public jobs. 
One of the four algorithms employed to estimate the effect in the trimmed sam-
ple revealed a significant positive effect, 0.74% and 0.41%, respectively, both in 
the programme year and after two years. Moreover, the nearest neighbour method 
on the full sample has also identified a positive, although non-significant impact 
in both cases. At the same time, the three others found a negative impact on youth 
employment in the programme year on average, lowering youth employment for 
the full and trimmed samples by –0.63% and –0.26%, respectively. While statisti-
cally insignificant, it is noteworthy that the IMF may have a positive impact on 
youth employment after governments’ compliance on conditionality. Thus, we 
conclude that due to contractionary conditions, the IMF programmes’ immediate 
impact on youth employment is negative, while it is likely to contribute to the 
improvement in youth employment after two years of programme initiation. 
Propensity score matching was employed in this study, which partially solves 
the bias of selection, controlling it just on observables. It lacks to control on 
unobservables and to treat adverse selection caused by bad type government. 
Hence, PSM has been used in combination with the DiD estimator, which par-
tially address the problem of unobservables. Apart from economic covariates, 
the current study has introduced political variables in probit regression, which 
replenishes Garuda’s (2000) study, where the author calculated the scores based 
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solely on economic factors. Furthermore, as has been advised, we have employed 
not just linear correlations, but higher-order terms (logarithmic and squared val-
ues of covariates) on the model to better define propensity scores. 
In order to ensure the robustness of the results, we utilised four different types 
of matching algorithms: nearest neighbour, radius, kernel, and stratification. To 
shed light on the rigorousness of the results and to show the likelihood of the 
results to be driven by a particular specification is low, the matching has been 
applied to both the full and the trimmed sample. The sample was trimmed by 
eliminating countries that have never participated in the programme during the 
observed period, taking into consideration the Heckman et al.’s (1997) assump-
tion that the treatment effect should be measured for whom it has been designed. 
In addition, the average treatment effect on changes in unemployment was esti-
mated to check the sensitivity of results and found the results to be persistent. 
Since our goal has been to reveal the IMF effects on employment in the EU, 
we have employed a restricted sample, which should further be enhanced and 
encompasses all countries for the given period, where by using other models, 
regional dummy variables could be included to identify the effects in different 
regions. Another option could be separation of states with independent and de-
pendent monetary policies since there is evidence that employment in countries 
with restricted independence of monetary policy is more affected. It will be in-
teresting to observe IMF programme effects on other labour market outcomes, 
to evaluate whether public or private employment, female and male workers, or 
qualified and blue-collar personnel are more affected. It should be mentioned 
that the applied method may still contain bias, which should be addressed in 
further studies. 
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